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Penalty Discount Rate: I 
I  n October 1979, as part of its program for 
bringing down the rate of  monetary growth, 
and hence inflation, the Federal Reserve 
adopted new procedures for controlling the 
stock of money. The new procedures control 
money from the supply side by manipulating 
the quantity of  total bank reserves, rather than 
from the demand side through interest rates. 
Banks legally must hold reserves equal to 
fixed percentages of various types of  deposits 
in the form of  either deposits with the Fed or 
vault cash. (By "banks," we mean all 
depository institutions with transaction 
deposits, since such institutions must hold 
reserves with the Fed under the terms of the 
1980 Monetary Control Act.) Therefore, by 
fixing the total quantity of reserves available 
to the banking system, the new operating 
procedures allow the Fed to control the total 
amount of bank deposits, and hence stock of 
money, that banks are able to create. 
Two sources of reserves are available to 
/ banks. Nonborrowed reserves are owned 
outright by the banks and supplied by the Fed 
through purchases of securities. Borrowed 
reserves are supplied through loans from the 
Fed on a temporary basis. The Fed can closely 
control the amount of nonborrowed reserves 
by means of  open market operations in 
securities. However, the Fed has only indirect 
control over the small but potentially volatile 
portion of  total bank reserves which banks 
borrow from the Fed at the discount window. 
These borrowed reserves are created 
primarily at the discretion of the borrowing 
institutions. Consequently, some analysts 
suggest that the precision of  monetary control 
would be strengthened under the new 
operating procedures if  the Fed kept the cost 
6f reserves at the window (the discount rate) 
above the cost of reserves in the private 
financial market (the Federal funds rate) so as 
to stabilize borrowed reserves at low levels. 
As discussed in our next Weekly Letter, the 
successful operation of a penalty discount 
rate would require a switch to 
contemporaneous reserve accounting from 
the current system of lagged reserve 
accounti'ng, which sets required reserves on 
the basis of  deposits two weeks earlier. 
However, since the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors recently announced that it is 
contemplating this change, it is interesting to 
assess how well a penalty discount rate might 
work if  contemporaneous reserve accounting 
were introduced. 
Rationale 
The Fed sets the basic discount rate (now 14 
percent), as well as a surcharge (now 2 
percent) for frequent borrowing by large 
institutions. Banks then decide on the total 
amount that they wish to borrow, subject to 
the Fed's rules on frequency and duration. 
While borrowed reserves constitute only 2 to 
3 percent of total reserves on average, 
fluctuations in borrowings can contribute 
significantly to movements in total reserves at 
any particular time. Some analysts thus have 
proposed reforming discount-window 
operations so that borrowed reserves might 
be made more controllable and thus more 
predictable. With greater predictability, the 
Fed would be able to hit its targets for total 
bank reserves more easily by controlling the 
non  borrowed component. 
At present the discount rate tends on average 
to fall below market rates of interest, although 
the Fed adjusts it up or down in response to 
movements in market rates. Moreover, the 
spread between these rates tends to be 
variable because of  the discontinuous nature 
of  the adjustments in the discount rate, which 
result in fluctuations in banks' incentive to 
borrow from the Fed. Banks' "reluctance to 
borrow" and the System's administrative 
procedures tend to hold borrowing in check, 
but the actual amount of borrowing varies 
positively with the difference between 
market rates and the discount rate (see chart). IF\~cdl~1f©\n  JJ«~~~ffW~ 
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Tying the discount rate to market rates would 
eliminate fluctuations in the incentive to 
borrow, and thus would help make 
borrowings more predictable. Still, this 
would not eliminate all of the variability in 
borrowing. To keep such variability to an 
absolute minimum, the Fed would also have 
to set the discount rate at a penalty level, 
somewhat above market interest rates.  Banks 
without alternative souces of  funds for 
maldng adjustments in reserve positions 
cou Id still do so at reasonable cost. But the 
amount of borrowing would be quite small 
and therefore considerably more predictable 
than it is now because banks would generally 
find it less costly to borrow in the private 
financial markets than at the window. 
Sources of control errors 
Whether a penalty discount rate would 
actually help to improve monetary control 
depends upon the size of  the errors stemming 
from the variabi I  ity in borrowed reserves, and 
also upon the system of reserve requirements 
in use. To analyze those factors, we first 
examine the major sources of  error in 
monetary control duringthe initial year of  the 
Fed's new operating procedure, and then 
consider the implications of alternative 
reserve-requ i  rement systems. 
A monetary aggregate may deviate from the 
mid-point of the annual target range for four 
different reasons. The first of  these is an 
"intentional" deviation -a  difference 
between the System's targeted short-run path 
for the monetary aggregate and the mid-poi  nt 
of its annual target range. Intentional 
deviations occur when the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) instructs the 
Trading Desk to supply bank reserves 
consistent with money paths that are closer to 
the upper or lower bound of  the annual target 
range. For example, for a time in the spring of 
1980 when M 1-B was below its target range, 
the FOMC chose a short-run path close to the 
lower bound of the annual target range, to 
avoid an excessive interest-rate decline that 
could have weakened the dollar and 
adversely affected inflationary expectations. 
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Overall, in the first year of  the new operating 
procedure, the absolute monthly deviation of 
M l-B from the mid-point of its annual target 
range averaged 1.40 percent. But M l-B 
deviated on average by on  Iy .78 percent from 
the FOMC's desired short~run path. So the 
Committee's "intentional" deviations were 
quite significant. 
Three different types of operating errors also 
caused deviations from the FOMC's desired 
short-run growth path. For any given month, 
these included misses due to 1) errors in the 
projected "multiplier" relationship between 
the monetary aggregate and total bank 
reserves, 2) errors in hitting the targeted path 
for nonborrowed reserves, and 3) errors in 
,projecting the total amount of 
discount-window borrowing. The first two 
types of  error were both relatively small 
.  compared to the third in the first year of  the 
new operating procedure. The average 
absolute monthly deviation was .47 percent 
for the M 1-B multiplier (in relation to its 
predicted value), and was .43 percent for 
non  borrowed reserves (in relation to the 
target~d path for total reserves). In contrast, 
the average absolute deviation of borrowed 
reserves from projected levels (also as a 
percent of  the total reserve path) was.  94 
percent -twice  as large as either of the other 
two types of  operati ng errors. 
The size of  the errors in projecting borrowing 
would seem to support the case for a penalty 
discount rate. However, if  these errors 
partially tend to offset the other two types of 
errors, monetary control would not 
necessari Iy be worsened by borrowed 
reserve variability. A significant amount of 
offsetting actually occurred, since the sum of 
all three operating errors amounted to 1.84 
percent -over  twice the .78 percent average 
deviation of  the Ml-B from the FOMC's 
short-run path. The major reason was an 
inverse relation between errors in projecting 
borrowed reserves and errors in predicting 
the multiplier. Because of  the tendency for 
offsetting errors, we cannot tell from the data 
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borrowing errors obtainable through 
introducing a penalty discount rate would 
actually improve monetary control. Our next 
Weekly Letter wi  II present some evidence on 
whether a penalty rate would be likely to 
reduce control errors on balance. 
Alternatives to penalty rate 
Even if  a penalty rate were not adopted, errors 
in monetaiy control arising from variability in 
borrowings could be reduced in other 
ways-first by making more forward-looking 
projections of  the level of borrowing. In the 
first year under the new operating 
procedures, the Fed generally set projected 
borrowings each month at a level equal to the 
average amount of borrowing in the previous 
control period. This procedure generates 
reasonably accurate forecasts of borrowing 
when interest rates are stable. But the 
procedure tends to underestimate borrowing 
in periods of  rising interest rates, and does the 
reverse in periods of falling interest rates. 
Although the Fed sometimes revises 
borrowing projections within the control 
period, errors still have generally been 
associated with the direction of  changes in 
interest rates. However, the Fed can predict 
interest rates to some extent, because their 
movements flow partly from the adjustments 
in total bank reserves required to keep the 
monetary aggregates on path. Therefore, a 
more forward-looking setting of  the projected 
borrowing level atthe beginning of a control 
period, as well as larger adjustments within it, 
might help to reduce borrowing errors. 
Errors in projected borrowing also could be 
reduced by more frequent adjustments in the 
discount rate, to keep it more closely in line 
with market rates of  interest. Borrowing levels 
cou Id be made more predictable if  there were 
smaller fluctuations in the incentive to 
borrow, through greater flexibility in the 
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discount rate. Of  course, in the extreme this 
wou  Id be equ ivalent to tyi  ng the d iscou nt rate 
to current market rates. Unfortunately, 
however, there are limits to the feasible 
amountof  short-run flexibility in the discount 
rate under the present system of lagged 
reserve accounting, where reserves are 
required against deposits outstanding two 
weeks earlier. Tying the discount rate to 
current market rates, either at a penalty level 
or otherwise, with lagged reserve accounting 
would tend to produce a short-run ratcheting 
in the level of interest rates, because the 
amountof  reserves desired by banks is almost 
completely fixed within any two-week 
period. For example, a discount-rate increase 
produced by a rise in market rates would 
drive up the Federal-funds rate as banks tried 
to borrow reserves from each other instead of 
the Fed, and this would then produce a 
further increase in the discount rate, and so 
on. 
In summary, we could obtain some reduction 
in monetary-control operating errors by using 
more forward-looking projections of 
borrowed reserves and by maki ng more 
frequent adjustments of  the discount rate. But 
with the present system of I  agged reserve 
accounting, the apparently simple solution of 
tying the discount rate to current market rates 
(ateither a penalty level or  otherwise), would 
create very large instabilities in interest rates. 
Moreover, even under contemporaneous 
reserve accounting a tied or penalty rate 
might not actually reduce monetary-control 
errors by much, or at all, if borrowing errors 
tend mainly to offset opposite multiplier 
errors. In our next Weekly Letter, we will 
detail the changes in reserve requirements 
necessary for the successfu I operation of a 
penalty discount rate, as well as the likely 
resulting errors in monetary control. 
John P. Judd and Adrian W. Throop . 
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RANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in miflions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercljil Danks . 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand dePosits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
r  eserve POSitlOl1 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reseryes (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,997  7.7 
12,114  10.1 
5,152  14.7 
5,920  12.1 
722  3.0 
380  33.6 
1,029  - 15.6 
84  - 0.5 
6,328  - 13.1 
5,510  - 15.6 
406  - 1.4 
21,178  32.6 
21,984  39.1 
9,635  39.8 
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